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Abstract 
This paper provides a qualitative and numerical analysis of a potential Doha agree-
ment of multilateral trade liberalisation following the summer ‘mini-ministerial’ 
meeting of negotiators in Geneva during July 2008. We discuss the latest draft mo-
dalities for agricultural and non-agricultural market access, dated 10 July 2008. For 
the numerical analysis, we design a Doha-scenario, which reflects the draft modali-
ties as closely as possible, and employ the GTAP model and database to estimate the 
economic impacts of such an agreement. We find that the agreement has positive 
global welfare implications of around US$ 55 billion, corresponding to around 0.2 
percent of GDP. The Danish economy also benefits from the agreement, largely due 
to improved access for the Danish pork industry to important protected export mar-
kets such as Japan. Throughout the paper, we take global and Danish perspectives on 
Doha. 
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Introduction 
This paper provides a qualitative and numerical analysis of a potential Doha agree-
ment of multilateral trade liberalisation following the summer ‘mini-ministerial’ 
meeting of negotiators in Geneva during July 2008. More specifically, it discusses the 
latest draft modalities2 for agricultural and non-agricultural market access (NAMA), 
dated 10 July 2008, augmented by a specific proposal for solutions to outstanding is-
sues made by the director-general of WTO, Pascal Lamy, during the mini-ministerial. 
For the numerical analysis, we design a Doha-scenario, which reflects the draft mo-
dalities as closely as possible, and employ the Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) model and database constructed by the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
to estimate the economic impacts of such an agreement. Throughout the paper, we 
take global and Danish perspectives on Doha. 
 
The mini-ministerial in Geneva in July 2008 ended without the planned agreement on 
modalities for agriculture and NAMA (The New York Times, 2008). WTO-pessimists 
would argue that this meeting was the very last call for a successful completion of the 
Doha round, and that the failure of the meeting has rendered the round definitively 
dead (Krugman, 2008). Optimists, on the other hand, point to the fact that the round 
has crept along until now despite repeating statements of ‘very last chance’ and ‘de-
finitively dead’ on numerous occasions in the past, and that although full agreement 
could not be reached, negotiations advanced considerably forward on a number of 
thorny issues (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2008). In any event, most commentators 
agree that the failure of the meeting makes it very difficult to come to a conclusion of 
the round within the next few years due to upcoming political events such as elections 
in USA and India and the appointment of a new EU commission. Further progress on 
the Doha round is generally not expected until 2010 at the earliest (The Economist, 
2008), although as late as September 2008, Pascal Lamy talked about calling minis-
ters back to Geneva in an effort to solve the remaining issues (WTO, 2008e). 
 
Nevertheless, difficulties in reaching a Doha agreement does not diminish the value 
of detailed qualitative and quantitative studies of the multilateral negotiations. Firstly, 
this paper serves to highlight the complexities of the modalities, which are the results 
of intense negotiations necessitating compromises on a wide range of contentious is-
sues, particularly in agricultural market access liberalisation. Thus, it illustrates why 
 
2 Modalities refer to the rules and formulae governing each country’s tariff reductions and other 
concessions. After the modalities have been agreed upon, each country will prepare their new tariff 
schedules incorporating specific tariff cuts based on the modalities. 
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multilateral trade agreements are so difficult to conclude. Secondly, it indicates what 
is at stake for the world economy in general and Denmark in particular. For instance, 
is the strong commitment to multilateral liberalisation by the Danish political estab-
lishment (government as well as opposition) justified? Finally, the authors believe 
that the Doha round is still alive (if not kicking), and that some agreement will even-
tually be concluded. The WTO is more than just a forum for negotiating trade liber-
alisation. It provides a well established rules-based trading system with a Dispute Set-
tlement Body that can adjudicate trade disputes and impose sanctions on transgres-
sors. Even if enthusiasm for further trade liberalisation is presently at a low level, few 
political leaders are prepared to jeopardize the authority of the WTO by admitting 
permanent failure of the Doha round. 
 
There is a large and growing literature on applied analysis of the Doha round. Hess 
and von Cramon-Taubadel (2008) count more than 1200 studies that analyses some 
aspect of the negotiating round and of these roughly 400 studies that provide numeri-
cal estimates of Doha impacts. Researchers at IFPRI and the World Bank (Berishi-
Krasniqi, et al, 2008; Laborde, et al, 2008) and Centre d’Études Prospectives et 
d’Information Internationales (CEPII) (Decreux and Fontagné, 2008) among others 
follow the negotiations closely and publishes numerical estimates of updated potential 
Doha agreements at a regular basis.  
 
Results of the studies vary greatly due to differences in methodology and scenario de-
sign. Hess and von Cramon-Taubadel (2008) conduct a meta-analysis of a large num-
ber of applied analyses of the Doha round. They find that variations in methodology 
explain an important share of the differences in results. For instance, the choice of 
Armington elasticities (some of the most important parameters in applied trade mod-
els) greatly affects the size of economic impacts, with higher elasticities typically 
generating larger numbers. In conclusion, they emphasise the importance of carefully 
stating assumptions and methodology when conducting applied trade analysis. We 
follow their recommendation by providing such details in the appendix. 
 
Hess and von Cramon-Taubadel (2008) also point to the specific details of the scenar-
ios as important explanatory factors. Scenarios are typically designed as best guesses 
of the outcome of a Doha agreement made at the time of study and subject to meth-
odological constraints. Hence, older studies lacking the knowledge of the details of a 
future agreement tend to assume a simple average reduction in all tariffs and subsidies 
(e.g. 50 percent), possibly including other issues, such as trade facilitation or services 
liberalisation (e.g. Francois, et al, 2005). As the negotiations progress and countries’ 
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positions slowly converge on specific issues, the scenarios incorporate more detailed 
provisions and become much more complicated (e.g. Anderson, et al 2006). One of 
the latest analyses by CEPII researchers (Decreux and Fontaigné, 2008) estimates the 
outcome of an agreement resembling the May 2008 draft modalities, incorporating 
detailed provisions for agricultural and NAMA liberalisation as well as a simple as-
sumption regarding services liberalisation.  
 
The present paper is largely comparable to the CEPII study. We use a similar model 
and draw on the same base data. However, we focus purely on agricultural and 
NAMA liberalisation, as the outcome of other parts of the Doha round, such as ser-
vices liberalisation and trade facilitation, are still uncertain. We further develop the 
scenarios to include additional issues, such as tariff escalation in agriculture and anti-
concentration in NAMA, which are not part of the CEPII study. Also, uniquely in the 
literature we focus on implications for the Danish economy. 
 
We start by discussing the background of the current Doha round including the key 
position of some of the major participants and Denmark in particular. Then we de-
scribe the contents of the draft modalities for agriculture and NAMA in some detail 
(even greater details are provided in the appendix). We find that the draft modalities 
for agriculture are much more complex than those for NAMA, despite the fact that 
NAMA has a larger global impact than agriculture. This serves to illustrate the sensi-
tivity of the agricultural negotiations – many compromises are needed to make the 
outcome palatable for all paticipants. After the qualitative discussion of the draft mo-
dalities for agriculture and NAMA, we introduce the model used for the quantitative 
analysis. Then we present and interpret our results and the paper is concluded by a 
short discussion. 
Background 
History 
Originally, the declaration from Doha that launched the present round of trade nego-
tiations, November 14, 2001, stipulated that modalities within agriculture were to be 
agreed upon no later than March 31, 2003. As is apparent, agreement on modalities 
were not reached by that date. The Cancun ministerial conference in September 2003 
ended abruptly without consensus. Nevertheless, at August 1, 2004, an agreement 
concerning the framework for modalities was reached along with an extension of the 
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initial deadline, January 1, 2005, for the Doha round of negotiations. Although not 
specifically a modalities agreement this so-called “July framework package” con-
tained an over-all outline of future more detailed liberalisation commitments. In Hong 
Kong, December 2005, the ministerial declaration presented a new imminent deadline 
for modalities for both agriculture and NAMA to be April 20, 2006. This deadline 
also turned out to be too ambitious.  
 
Although the Doha negotiations have been in a state of limbo for several years, agri-
cultural policies have developed. Particularly, the European Union unilaterally re-
formed its domestic support regime considerably and promised to phase out export 
subsidies by 2015. The mid-term review of the EU agricultural policy in 2003 re-
sulted in a conversion of hectare and animal premiums into single farm payments. 
The objective was to decouple farm subsidies from the production decision, thus re-
ducing market distortions. Thereby most of EU domestic support can be transferred 
from the blue box (trade distorting domestic support) to the green box (less trade dis-
torting) category, which is not disciplined by WTO agreements. As a result, along 
with the promise to phase out export subsidies two major areas of contention in the 
Doha negotiations was settled, at least from the European point of view.  
Key positions of major players 
The difficulties in reaching an agreement are caused by large divergence in the inter-
ests of member countries and their limited willingness to compromise. Previous nego-
tiating rounds, which were not without their share of problems, concentrated mostly 
on liberalisation of trade in non-agricultural products among industrialised countries. 
Two aspects of the current round makes consensus hard to achieve, i) agriculture, 
which is a highly sensitive and greatly distorted sector, is a prominent part of the 
round; and ii) the Doha round was heralded as a ‘development’ round, in which Spe-
cial and Differential Treatment  (SDT) should be given to developing countries. The 
last point has been seen by developing countries as an indication that they would not 
be expected to make significant concessions in return for liberalisation by developed 
countries, whereas developed countries still expect some liberalisation commitment 
(albeit at less than full reciprocity) by at least the larger developing countries, such as 
India, China and Brazil. 
 
The main interests of developing countries are to gain improved market access for ag-
ricultural products into developed country markets and to force industrialised coun-
tries to reduce (or eliminate) agricultural subsidies. In spite of the fairly comprehen-
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sive reform towards more decoupled domestic support by the EU, developing coun-
tries in general consider the over-all amount of agricultural support to be a focal issue 
in the negotiations. It can be argued that no support is entirely decoupled (non-
distorting) and will have some, albeit small, effect on production decisions, wherefore 
even green box support should be disciplined to some extent. Nevertheless, the dis-
tance between the EU and developing countries in general on domestic support and 
export subsidies has been reduced considerably. The USA, on the other hand, retains 
most of its domestic support in more coupled forms of payments and plans to 
strengthen the agricultural support with the Farm Bill 2008 currently underway 
through Congress. Thus, the main disagreement on domestic support seems to be be-
tween developing countries and the USA. 
 
In terms of agricultural market access the largest divergence exists between develop-
ing countries and the EU, mainly due to high EU tariffs on agricultural products in 
general and particularly on commodities, such as bananas, sugar, rice and beef, which 
are of great interest to developing countries. In return for the high general reductions 
in tariffs demanded by developing countries, the EU insists on the right to designate a 
large number of products (tariff lines) as sensitive, implying smaller tariff reductions. 
 
The controversies in the agricultural negotiations are almost exactly mirrored by the 
disagreements over NAMA liberalisation. In order for developed countries to be able 
to grant large concessions on agricultural market access and support, they demand re-
ciprocation in terms of greater access to developing country markets for industrial 
products, particularly in the large growth economies of China, India and Brazil. How-
ever, in line with the ‘development’ objective of the Doha round, these countries de-
mand quite comprehensive Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) together with 
the other developing countries, a demand that has made the negotiations in the Trade 
and Development committee under the WTO, where SDT negotiations are meant to 
take place, very difficult. The EU and the US are prepared to concede extensive SDT 
provisions for the poorest developing economies but are not willing to let China, India 
and Brazil obtain the same. 
 
In addition to these main issues, a myriad of smaller controversies in agriculture re-
quires a solution, such as liberalisation of the EU’s banana regime demanded by 
South American banana exporters (opposed by former EU colonies enjoying preferen-
tial access), calls for reduction of US cotton subsidies by West African cotton grow-
ers, and EU’s desire to extent the protection of Geographical Indicators (e.g. Roque-
fort Cheese) to other products than wine and spirits (opposed by the USA and some 
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other countries). Also, in addition to agricultural liberalisation and NAMA, a Doha 
agreement will contain provisions on trade facilitation (e.g. streamlining of customs 
procedures), and liberalisation of trade in services and environmental goods.  
Danish trade policy 
In Denmark, a broad majority is very much in favour of multilateral trade liberalisa-
tion. However, Denmark is part of the European Union that has been given the man-
date to conduct the negotiations on behalf of all the EU member countries. Thus, in-
dividual EU member countries do not in principle take part in the WTO negotiations. 
The Danish position concerning the WTO negotiations is, therefore, a part of the EU 
policy making process where each member country submits their positions and meets 
for negotiations in order for the EU commission to formulate a common EU position. 
All EU member countries have to agree upon the common proposal. Within the EU 
quite different views of international trade rules are represented. In general, the south-
ern EU countries are reluctant to open up the EU markets too much, whereas the 
northern countries push for liberalisations. 
 
The general procedure for formulating the Danish position is that involved ministries, 
particularly the Ministry for Food and the Ministry for Business under the auspices of 
the Foreign Ministry, gathers interested parties such as business organisations, NGOs, 
researchers and other, in discussion forums with the aim of collecting different views 
and demands for the WTO. Specifically, these discussions take place in the so-called 
Beach Club network. Subsequently, the Foreign Ministry in conjunction with the 
other involved ministries formulates a position paper, which the government has to 
agree upon. The governments’ position is then subjected to discussion and negotiation 
with other parliament parties. Since the WTO position is part of EU policy the proce-
dure has to follow the established EU policy making procedure in the Danish Parlia-
ment. This involves a practice of establishing a wide consensus in parliament. With 
regard to WTO positions this has proven fulfilled. Thus, from left to right in the par-
liament, there is very little disagreement on the Danish WTO position. 
 
In order to further the Danish position in the EU, alliances with other like-minded EU 
member countries are sought. However, the Danish position is at the extreme end of 
the EU member countries with a high liberal profile. Thus, only few EU member 
countries are in line with the Danish position. 
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Draft modalities on agriculture and NAMA 
The Chairman of the World Trade Organizations (WTO) agriculture negotiations, the 
New Zealand ambassador Crawford Falconer, and the Chairman of the NAMA nego-
tiations, the Canadian ambassador Don Stephenson, issued drafts on modalities on 
July 10, 2008 (WTO, 2008a; 2008b). These draft modalities (hereafter referred to as 
the Falconer and Stephenson drafts) present the latest attempt to combine the posi-
tions of the WTO member countries on the salient elements in the negotiations into a 
compromise proposal from which the talks towards a final agreement can proceed. 
During the mini-ministerial meeting of trade negotiators in Geneve in July 2008, di-
rector-general Pascal Lamy put forward proposals for specific numbers on most of the 
remaining outstanding issues. The two drafts together with Pascal Lamy’s compro-
mise proposal were generally accepted by most negotiators, except for one particular 
issue: the specific rules governing the Special Safeguard Mechanism, a device for 
protecting farmers in developing countries against surges in imports. In fact, after the 
mini-ministerial, Pascal Lamy noted that agreement had been reached on 18 topics of 
list of 20 outstanding issues – the Special Safeguard Mechanism being topic no. 19 
and cotton subsidies the 20th. The rest of this section takes a closer look at the Fal-
coner and Stephenson drafts, with more details provided in the appendix. 
The Falconer Draft 
The Falconer Draft concerns the trade rules for agriculture, arranged under three main 
headlines, domestic support (i.e. agricultural subsidies), market access (tariffs on ag-
ricultural products) and export competition (export subsidies on agricultural prod-
ucts). 
 
Domestic support 
In the text from 2006 known as the July framework package an agreement between 
the WTO members was reached regarding the formula to be used for reducing domes-
tic support. Trade-distorting support is to be reduced according to a tiered formula 
approach. The tiered formula categorises each country’s domestic support according 
to the total value of the support and assigns progressively higher reduction commit-
ments to tiers of higher support value. Thus, the more domestic support is provided, 
the larger the required cuts (in percentage terms). Although the Falconer draft pro-
vides ranges upon which the different positions tend to converge, the precise required 
cuts in each tier have yet to be agreed upon. Due to the Special and Differential 
Treatment provisions, concessions required from developing countries are two-thirds 
of reductions demanded from developed countries phased in over longer implementa-
tion periods. In addition, particular groups of countries, such as least developed coun-
tries and poor net food-importing countries, are exempt from making any commit-
ments. Domestic support is a major issue of contention, particular between the USA 
on one side and developing countries on the other. 
 
Negotiations are based on Final Bound domestic support determined for each country 
by the Uruguay Round Agreement. The Final Bound level of support provides the up-
per limit of trade distorting support allowed by the agreement. However, often actual 
levels of support are much lower than the Final Bound levels – a phenomenon often 
referred to as ‘water’ in the domestic support. This implies that even large reductions 
in bound domestic support may not have much real economic effect if the reduced 
ceiling is not binding. For instance, the final offer made by the USA during the mini-
ministerial was to cap its level of trade distorting domestic support at US$ 14.5 bil-
lion, down from US$ billion 48.2 representing a 70 percent cut in Final Bound sup-
port. However, actual trade distorting payments in 2008 were estimated at around 
US$ 7 billion, implying that the concessions by the USA would have no effect on ac-
tual payments, at least in the short run. The relatively low level of US domestic sup-
port is largely due to the current high agricultural prices and the reduced ceiling may 
become binding in the future as agricultural prices fall. 
 
Market access 
The text on market access for agricultural products is the most complicated part of the 
draft modalities, suggesting that this area is the most contentious part of the negotia-
tions. The Falconer draft stipulates a general rule for reduction of tariffs, a tiered for-
mula similar to the one used for domestic support (but with a different number of tiers 
and different coefficients). The text deviates from this general formula by a large 
number of exceptions (and exceptions to exceptions). Similar to domestic support, the 
SDT provisions require smaller tariff reductions from developing countries and par-
ticular groups of developing countries, such as least developed countries and recently 
acceded members, make even fewer commitments. In addition, developed countries 
promised to provide least developed countries tariff- and quota-free access for all 
products (possibly subject to an implementation period for some sensitive products). 
 
The most important exception to the general rule is the sensitive product designation. 
Developed countries are allowed to designate 4 percent of all tariff lines as sensitive 
(under certain circumstances, this percentage may be raised to 6 percent – see appen-
dix for details). Developing countries may designate one third more, i.e. 
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15  - 8 per-
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cent of tariff lines as sensitive. Sensitive products receive a more lenient treatment 
than the general tiered formula, allowing members to moderate the ordinary tariff re-
ductions by up to two-thirds in return for expansion of the Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ).  
 
Allowing even a small number of sensitive products can have large implications for 
the outcome of the Doha round due to the presence of tariff peaks. For many coun-
tries, the variation in the size of tariffs is very large. Most tariffs may be low or mod-
erate in size, but often a few key commodities are protected by extremely high tariffs. 
As the standard tiered formula reduces the highest tariffs the most, this is where the 
largest gains from agricultural liberalisation can be achieved. Therefore, allowing 
countries to exempt or greatly moderate tariff reductions for these highly sensitive 
sectors, which may account for just a few percent of the total number of tariff lines, 
could substantially diminish the gains from the Doha round. For instance, Anderson et 
al (2006) find that allowing developed countries to exempt just 2 percent of tariff 
lines from tariff reductions (and 4 percent for developing countries) would reduce the 
global welfare impact of a Doha agreement by as much as 76 percent. This is the rea-
son why sensitive product designation has been one of the most contentious issues 
during the negotiations. 
 
The TRQ was introduced during the Uruguay Round as a means of providing a mini-
mum of market access for products with high import tariffs. The quota establishes a 
specific quantity of the product, which may enter the country at a special low tariff 
rate (the in-quota tariff). Any imports above the quantity established by the quota are 
subject to the general high tariff rate (the over-quota tariff). The difference between 
the in-quota and over-quota tariff can be quite substantial and often the over-quota 
rate is prohibitive, i.e. so high that imports (above the quota) is effectively blocked. 
The Falconer draft provides different options for the treatment of sensitive products 
and TRQ expansion (the more lenient the treatment, the greater the quota expansion) 
and the details are extremely complex. 
 
In addition to the sensitive product designation, the SDT provisions of the Falconer 
draft allow developing countries the use of special product designations and the Spe-
cial Safeguard Mechanism. Special products are similar to sensitive products. It al-
lows developing countries to designate up to 12 percent of tariff lines as special, 
which means that they are exempt from tariff reductions according to the general 
tiered formula. Of those, up to 5 percent of total tariff lines may be fully exempt from 
any tariff reduction, provided that all special products, including the reduction-exempt 
ones, are subject to an average cut of 11 percent. There are no requirements for TRQ 
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expansion, but the special product designation must be based on a list of objective cri-
teria stipulated by the Falconer draft regarding importance of the products for the pro-
tection of rural livelihoods, etc. 
 
The Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM), the issue that stalled the negotiations dur-
ing the mini-ministerial, is a temporary tool designed to protect poor farmers from a 
sudden surge in imports of agricultural products. The Falconer draft provides specific 
criteria for when the SSM may kick-in, such as thresholds for the increase in imports, 
and rules for the temporary increase in tariffs.  
 
During the negotiations, compromises sometimes took place at the level of specific 
products or product groups. On cotton specifically, developed countries are commit-
ted to providing least developed countries immediate and total tariff and quota-free 
access for cotton (developing countries are encouraged, but not required, to do the 
same). The Falconer draft provides a list of tropical and diversification products, 
which are of great interest to developing countries in particular. Developed countries 
shall reduce tariffs on these products by more than what is required by the general 
tiered formula. Tariff escalation refers to a practise, where tariffs on raw materials 
(e.g. non-roasted coffee beans) are much lower than processed products higher in the 
value chain (e.g. roasted coffee). This practise provides incentives for developing 
countries to focus trade on primary rather than processed products and thereby ham-
pers the establishment of a domestic agricultural processing industry. To alleviate tar-
iff escalation, the Falconer draft provides a matrix of primary commodities linked to 
processed products that use the commodities as inputs. If the general tiered formula 
results in a tariff schedule where tariffs on processed products are higher than on the 
linked primary commodities, processed product tariffs will be subject to larger reduc-
tions. This requirement applies to developed countries only (developing countries are 
encouraged to apply it as well). 
 
Export Competition 
The previously much contested issue of export subsidies appears to have been settled. 
This section in the Falconer draft is quite short and consists of general provisions with 
very few exceptions. Export subsidies are to be phased out. The issues of Export 
Credits, State Trading Enterprises and Food Aid are subjected to comply with specific 
provisions. 
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Current status of agricultural negotiations 
The chairman of the Agricultural negotiations states that “there was a credible basis 
for conclusion on very many (and possibly one could have said “nearly all”) issues” 
(WTO, 2008d). On domestic support the chairman sees few remaining issues and 
states that agreement could have been reached on these. Likewise, on export subsidies 
and export policies an agreement is very close. The major remaining area of contro-
versy concerns market access of which the SSM is part. Besides the SSM disagree-
ment, no convergence has been achieved regarding tariff simplification. However, on 
most other market access issues the chairman believes consensus is within reach. The 
outstanding issue of cotton was not substantively addressed before the negotiations 
broke down. A crude measure of the extent of convergence in the agriculture negotia-
tions can be delivered by the number of brackets in the chairman’s compromise pro-
posal texts on modalities. A bracket in the text shows an issue not agreed upon. At 
Feb 8, 2008 the agriculture text contained 229 brackets. This was reduced to 37 by 
May 19 and further reduced to 17 at July 10. Thus, based on this indicator substantial 
progress has been achieved. 
The Stephenson Draft 
The Stephenson Draft comprises the issue of market access rules for non-agricultural 
products. Generally, this issue has not been at the forefront in the Doha round. How-
ever, NAMA-negotiations has become much more contentious with the developed 
countries demanding significantly improved market access for NAMA-products from 
the large high-growth developing countries in return for concessions on agricultural 
market access and domestic support. 
 
Tariff reductions 
Contrary to the agricultural negotiations where a more complex tiered approach is 
used for tariff reductions, in the NAMA negotiations the countries have agreed upon a 
single general formula to be applied on all tariffs, albeit with some exemptions. The 
formula to be used for tariff reductions has been agreed to be a so-called Swiss for-
mula. A Swiss formula approach entails larger cuts for higher tariffs than for low tar-
iffs. Hence, a convergence of tariffs across the board is intended. 
 
The most important remaining issue regarding the formula is the value of the parame-
ter to apply. The value of the parameter determines the size of the implied tariff re-
ductions. Different parameter values are suggested for developed and developing 
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countries whereby higher reductions in tariffs are intended for developed members 
and lower reductions for developing countries.  
 
Flexibilities 
In the NAMA negotiations the issue of flexibilities addresses much the same consid-
erations as the issue of sensitive products in the Agriculture negotiations, except that 
only developing countries are allowed to designate flexibilities and there are no off-
set requirements to establish TRQs. A range of different flexibility options for devel-
oping countries have been proposed by which a number of tariff lines can be com-
pletely exempt from reductions or lower reductions are required. In the Stephenson 
draft there are five different options stipulating various combinations of Swiss for-
mula parameter, extent of flexibilities (no. of tariff lines) and degree to which the tar-
iff cut requirements for products marked by flexibilities are reduced. Developing 
countries may each choose one of these options according to their particular interests. 
 
The flexibility tool is supposed to help developing countries shield their nascent in-
dustries from competition from developed countries and thereby facilitate industriali-
sation. However, as some developing countries’ tariffs are very high, the exceptions 
are potentially highly distorting and actually risks hurting other developing countries 
in the process. Jensen et al (2007) estimates the outcome of flexibility designation and 
shows that of the 10 countries, whose exports to developing countries are most af-
fected by the flexibility tool, seven are other developing countries. For instance, al-
most 40 percent of Malawi’s non-agricultural exports covers tariff lines that are esti-
mated to be designated as flexible. In contrast, only 0.1 percent of Danish exports are 
affected. This bias is largely due to a significant south-south trade in industrial goods. 
 
A recent addition to the Stephenson draft is the issue of anti-concentration of flexibil-
ity-designation by developing countries. The anti-concentration clause is designed to 
hinder developing countries designating entire product groups, e.g. the whole automo-
tive industry, as covered by flexibilities. The stipulations are fairly mild, but should 
ensure that at least some liberalisation takes place in all industries. 
 
Other provisions 
SDT provisions in the NAMA negotiations have been granted to different country 
groups, as under the Agriculture negotiations. Furthermore, proposals have been 
made that developing country customs unions should be allowed greater flexibility 
due to the inability of the individual member countries of such a customs union to ex-
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ert individual flexibility. Hence, a new set of country group could become eligible for 
exemptions.  
 
Non-Tariff Barriers (NTB) is also part of the negotiations. These negotiations are 
very technical due to the nature of the barriers and the vast number of different kinds 
of barriers in different product categories. Some progress has been made toward iden-
tifying, examining and categorising NTBs ultimately aiming at reducing or eliminat-
ing barriers to entry.  
 
Current status of the NAMA negotiations 
The chairman of the NAMA negotiations states in his report that “there is much in 
that text on which there is very substantial convergence” (WTO, 2008d). However, 
several developing countries emphasize that the convergence on NAMA are condi-
tional upon the agriculture negotiations. The overall architecture of the NAMA 
agreement appear to be in place, however, some countries have specific objections or 
requests on minor issues, which remain to be solved. The brackets indicator, never-
theless, shows contrary to the agriculture negotiations less convergence from Febru-
ary to July. At Feb 8, 2008 the NAMA text included 56 brackets, which increased to 
130 by May 19 and further increased to 159 at July 10. This is mainly due to the in-
clusion of more options and exceptions, particularly for developing countries, in an 
effort to reach a compromise. 
Conclusion on the Doha negotiations 
The failure of the negotiators to reach an agreement has been formally ascribed to the 
controversy concerning the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM). Although the po-
tential import barriers made possible by the suggested SSM are of concern to particu-
larly the US, the issue is of minor importance compared to the scope of the contents 
of the compromise proposals. Accordingly, commentators have pointed to other rea-
sons for the break down. As seen in previous break downs of the WTO talks various 
“conspiracy theories” have been introduced as stated by the Director-General of WTO 
Pascal Lamy (CENTAD, 2008a). One of the difficult outstanding issues not addressed 
at the failed WTO meeting is the problem of cotton subsidies, where the US has quite 
substantial support for its cotton farmers. Hence, it has been suggested that US reluc-
tance to address this issue prompted the staunch opposition concerning the SSM. Fur-
thermore, US industry and commerce organisations have been criticising the lack of 
real market access to the larger developing countries resulting from the proposed 
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NAMA text as stated for instance by the US National Association of Manufacturers 
(NAM, 2008). 
 
India has shown at least equal opposition to yield any concessions on SSM as made 
clear by the Commerce and Industry Minister for India Kamal Nath stating that the 
Special Safeguard Mechanism is an issue of livelihood security, and not to serve the 
commercial interests of rich countries, and further he emphasised that there can be no 
trade-off between livelihood security and commercial interests, saying “I cannot ne-
gotiate how many farmers can commit suicide.” (CENTAD, 2008b). 
 
Despite negotiators dismissive attitude towards yielding concession on the SSM sub-
stantial progress has been made. The chairman of the Agriculture negotiations and the 
chairman of the NAMA negotiations each published a report outlining the situation in 
their respective areas after the break down of the negotiations. Both chairmen point 
out that significant convergence has been achieved; however, some issues remain to 
be solved. Furthermore, the chairmen as well as some negotiators emphasize that the 
agreement reached so far is conditional upon issues in which consensus have not been 
achieved yet. Thus, although negotiations primarily take place within sub-committees 
covering different areas the outcome is seen as part of an overall package where 
“nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”. 
Model analysis 
This section presents a quantitative analysis on the impact of the Falconer and Ste-
phenson drafts in terms of macroeconomic, trade and distributional effects. 
The GTAP model and database 
The economic analysis is based on an economic model of the world economy with 
particular emphasis on global trade and production covering 38 different product 
categories (of which 12 are primary agricultural products and 8 are processed food 
products) in 39 countries/regions. The starting point of the analysis is the Global 
Trade Analysis Projects (GTAP) database and model (Hertel, 1997). The database is 
the most recent Version 6 GTAP database with the base year 2001 (Dimaranan et al., 
2005).  
 
We the standard version of the GTAP model (please refer to Hertel, 1997 or 
www.gtap.org for details), except for the modelling of capital accumulation. Whereas 
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the standard GTAP model assumes fixed capital stock at the national level, we as-
sume that the capital stock is augmented by net investments (often referred to as the 
Baldwin closure – Francois et al, 1996). A positive change in income raises savings 
and investments. This is where the standard GTAP model stops. With the Baldwin 
closure, larger investments expand the capital stock, which in turn increases income, 
savings and investments further. This process continues until the economy reaches a 
‘steady state’, in which gross investments equal depreciation and net investment 
equals zero. Thus, the model can be viewed as a long-term model. 
Updating the database 2001 – 2015 
The GTAP database version 6 uses 2001 as the base year. A number of important de-
velopments have taken place since then or are planed for the immediate future preced-
ing implementation of a Doha round. In order not to attribute the effect of such devel-
opments to the Doha round scenario analysed in this paper, we update/project the da-
tabase from 2001 to the year 2015, by conducting a “pre-simulation” that involves 
implementing the assumptions listed in Box 1 below. We then take the resulting data 
set from the pre-simulation as the base for our Doha analysis. 
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Box 1. Assumptions used to update/project the database to 2015. 
Projections of the world economy from 2001 to 2015 
• Regional GDP, capital, labour force and population growth together with re-
gional-specific total factor productivity increases; 
 
Trade policy changes (updating initial 2001 tariff structure) 
• Final implementation of the UR commitments for developing countries; 
• Accession of China to the WTO; 
• Enlargement of the EU to include 12 new members; 
• Everything But Arms (EBA) Agreement between LDCs and the EU27; 
• The implementation of the TDCA agreement between South Africa and the 
EU27 
• The implementation of the AGOA on textiles and wearing apparel; 
• An update of Indian’s applied MFN tariff rates to the latest year available; 
• Final implementation of the NAFTA agreement; 
• Abolishment of export quotas on textiles and wearing apparel; 
 
Domestic policy changes 
• A stylized implementation of the Mid-Term Review Reform of the CAP’s, 
decoupling of direct payments to a single farm payment in the EU27; 
• No sugar and milk quotas in the EU27; 
• EU CAP budgetary expenditure fixed in nominal terms; 
• USA agricultural subsidies (expenditure) fixed in nominal terms at its 2001
level. 
 
Doha scenario 
The Doha scenario analysed in this paper follows the July 10th 2008 revisions of the 
Falconer and Stephenson drafts, augmented by Pascal Lamy’s proposed solution to 
outstanding issues put forward during the mini-ministerial of July 2008. As briefly 
discussed above, the draft modalities stipulate the general formulas and rules govern-
ing all countries future liberalisation commitments, but not the actual resulting tariff 
schedule. We therefore have to estimate the every country’s future tariff schedule 
based on the draft modalities and assumptions regarding countries choices among dif-
ferent options. These are detailed in the appendix. 
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The draft modalities contain some parts that are mandatory and permanent (e.g. tariff 
reduction formulae), some parts that temporary in nature (such as the Special Safe-
guard Mechanism) and some parts that are framed as ‘encouragements’ and thus ex-
pected to be of a more voluntary nature or subject to future negotiations (e.g. develop-
ing countries granting preferential market access to least developed countries or spe-
cial sectoral initiatives). We take a long term view of the impacts of Doha, and given 
the general reluctance to liberalise more than absolutely necessary, we choose to take 
a conservative approach to the scenario design. Hence, we only model the mandatory 
and permanent parts of the draft modalities, which is a common practise in the litera-
ture. 
 
One particular issue we cannot model in this CGE framework, is the expansion of 
Tariff Rate Quotas in return for lower tariff reductions on sensitive products. Al-
though the GTAP model is in principle capable of modeling tariff quotas, in practice 
this is extremely difficult at best and forces a number of unpalatable compromises 
(for instance, how do we aggregate tariff lines to GTAP concordance if some lines 
face binding quotas and others do not? – how do we aggregate different quotas?). 
Therefore, TRQ expansion is not part of our Doha-scenario (again, this is standard in 
the literature). This means that our results may slightly underestimate the impact of 
the agreement, particularly for agricultural commodities covered by TRQs. Thus, to-
gether with the conservative nature of our scenario design, the results can be seen as a 
lower bound of the impacts of a Doha agreement. 
 
Implementing the scenario  
In line with most of the recent literature, we design the Doha-scenario at the 6-digit 
(tariff line) level of the Harmonised Systems nomenclature. This is necessary in order 
to properly account for many complex issues of trade negotiations, such as the rules 
and exceptions of the draft modalities operating at the tariff line level, the impact of 
tariff peaks and ‘water’ in the tariffs. We use tariff data for the year 2001, obtained 
from the MAcMap database (Bouët et al 2004) and updated for the period 2001 – 
2015 as described above. This is the same data used in the GTAP database and our 
tariff calculations are therefore directly compatible with standard GTAP tariff data.3 
The NAMA product coverage follows the list of Non-Agricultural products included 
in the Stephenson draft. By definition, products not on this list fall under agriculture. 
 
3 In order to avoid a “mis-marriage” of data with our calculated shocks to the data base, we have 
first aggregated the MAcMAP database up to GTAP concordance without making any changes to 
the tariffs. We have then incorporated these tariffs into the initial GTAP data base before we began 
our update and NAMA reduction scenarios. 
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The scenario in summary 
Table 1 and Table 2 summarises the change in tariffs, from a global and a Danish per-
spective, due to the Doha agreement as defined in the Doha scenario. 
 
Table 1.  Average tariffs of selected countries, percent 
 
 Bound tariffs Applied tariffs 
  Pre-Doha Post-Doha Pre-Doha Post-Doha
 
EU 
Agriculture                    20.9                     8.7                   12.5                      6.7 
Non-agriculture                     4.1                     2.2                     1.8                      1.0 
USA 
Agriculture                     7.1                     3.1                     3.5                      2.0 
Non-Agriculture                     3.5                      1.8                     2.5                      1.2 
Other developed countries 
Agriculture                   60.0                   19.2                   20.7                    12.4 
Non-Agriculture                     7.7                     2.7                     2.6                      1.4 
 
China 
Agriculture                   17.0                   16.0                   14.5                    14.2 
Non-Agriculture                     9.6                     6.6                     9.5                      6.6 
India 
Agriculture                115.9                   78.1                   39.8                    38.5 
Non-Agriculture                   33.6                   14.3                   15.9                    13.9 
Other developing countries 
Agriculture                   52.9                   35.0                   17.1                    15.6 
Non-Agriculture                   29.0                   12.6                     9.6                      7.4 
 
Note: The table does not include Least Developed countries, Small Vulnerable Economies or countries with a 
low binding coverage (see appendix for details on country classifications). 
 
 
Fejl! Henvisningskilde ikke fundet. presents average bound and applied tariffs (cal-
culated as simple averages) of selected countries before and after the implementation 
of the Doha scenario. For instance, EUs average bound agricultural tariffs are reduced 
from 20.9 percent to 8.7 percent, which results in a reduction of actually applied tar-
iffs from 12.5 percent to 6.7 percent. 
 
Three major points can be gathered from the evidence. Firstly, agricultural tariffs tend 
to be much higher than non-agricultural tariffs, particularly among most developed 
countries. This is largely due to the successful completion of previous trade liberalisa-
tion rounds that concentrated mostly on non-agricultural trade liberalisation among 
OECD countries. Secondly, the Doha agreement is fairly successful in reducing 
bound tariffs, in spite of the numerous exceptions and flexibilities granted the mem-
ber countries. For most developed countries, bound tariffs are reduced by half on av-
erage, for developing countries somewhat less. In particular, Chinese cuts to bound 
tariffs are relatively small, which is due to the fact that China already has reduced tar-
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iffs considerably as part of the accession to WTO. Finally, comparing bound tariffs 
with applied tariffs reveals considerable water in the tariffs. As international trade 
agreements discipline bound tariffs and not actually applied tariffs directly, the Doha 
agreement will only affect applied tariffs if bound tariffs are lowered far enough to 
eliminate the binding overhang. The water in the agricultural tariffs of India and other 
developing countries is huge, resulting in a very small reduction in actually applied 
tariffs. 
 
Table 2.  Average applied tariffs facing Danish Imports and exports, percent 
 
 Applied tariffs Share EU trade 
Sector Pre-Doha Post-Doha of total share
 
D
 
anish Imports 
Total imports                2.5                1.3               68.9
Machinery                0.5                0.4                9.0               73.7
Electronics                1.3                0.9                8.4               76.9
Vehicles                8.1                3.6                4.5               80.7
Clothing                7.9                3.3                3.2               50.3
Dairy              58.8              35.7                0.4               82.0
B
 
eef              77.5              53.7                0.2               93.5
D
 
anish Exports 
Total exports                 8.0                4.7               63.8
Medicaments (incl. insulin)                1.3                1.3                3.3               47.7
Pork              53.9              20.3                3.2               54.7
Furniture                0.9                0.7                1.9               76.5
Electrical generators (incl. wind mills)                 2.2                1.9                1.4               62.3
Furskins (incl. mink furs)                 1.3                1.3                0.5               26.3
 
 
Table 2 provides a Danish perspective on the changes in applied tariffs faced by Dan-
ish importers and exporters in selected economic sectors due to the Doha agreement. 
For Danish Imports the tariffs are average Danish (common EU) tariffs weighted by 
Danish extra-EU imports. Thereby, the averages reflect the tariffs faced by Danish 
importers. Similarly, for Danish Exports the tariffs are calculated as average trade 
partner tariffs weighted by Danish extra-EU exports and the averages therefore reflect 
the tariffs Danish exporters face in destination countries. In addition, the table reports 
the relative weight of the sector in total import/export as well as the share of Danish 
trade taking place internally in the EU. For instance, Danish imports of machinery 
correspond to 9 percent of all imports, of which 73.7 percent originates from other EU 
countries. The rest faces an average tariff of 0.5 percent reduced to 0.4 percent as a 
result of the Doha agreement. 
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The table suggests that the implications of Doha for the Danish economy will be lim-
ited. With few exceptions the majority of Danish trade is internal EU trade, which is 
already fully liberalised and is therefore not directly affected by tariff reductions. 
Also, most of the large Danish import and export sectors already face very low tariffs. 
The major exception is the Danish pork industry, which benefits from a very large tar-
iff reduction at important non-EU export destinations (notably Japan). On the import 
side, consumers (and industries using imported intermediates) are likely to benefit 
from lower clothing and vehicle tariffs, although the impact of the latter is likely to be 
small as 80 percent of vehicle imports originate from other EU countries. 
 
The beef and dairy sectors are notable for the high level of protection in the EU and 
the relatively large reduction in import tariffs due to the Doha agreement. The high 
barriers on beef and dairy imports are reflected in the fact that Danish imports are al-
most entirely sourced from other EU members. The improved access for non-EU ex-
porters to Danish market is likely to adversely impact not only Danish beef and dairy 
industries but also other EU manufacturers, whose preferential access to the Danish 
market is eroded. Similarly, Danish exports of beef and dairy to other EU countries 
are likely to take a hit. 
Results 
The Global Welfare Effects 
Table 3 and Table 4 provide a global overview of the welfare implications of the 
Doha scenario. Welfare is measured in terms of Equivalent Variation, i.e. the mone-
tary value of changes in utility of the representative household measured in pre-
simulation prices. Table 3 disaggregates welfare effects by country/region and de-
composes the welfare impact into contributions from removal of agricultural export 
subsidies, liberalisation of agricultural market access and NAMA. Table 4 disaggre-
gates the total welfare impact by sector. Note that the totals in the agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors in Table 4 do not equal the contributions from liberalisation 
in agriculture and non-agriculture in Table 3 due to general equilibrium effects. Thus 
liberalisation of agricultural trade not only affects agricultural sectors, but also manu-
facturing and services through competition for primary factors (labour and capital). 
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Table 3.  Impact of Doha on welfare and GDP 
  
 
 
----------  Contributions to total wel are from  ---------f
 
 GDP growth Total welfare Agriculture Non-agriculture
    Export subsidies Market access Market access
 
 
 
percent -------------------------- Million US$ (2001) ------ -----------------------
 
EU 0.12 8,054 1,603 17 6,433
USA 0.03 391 551 225 -385
Canada 0.10 785 178 350 257
China 0.28 7,218 -49 -265 7,533
India 0.35 2,744 -2 48 2,698
Rest of Asia 0.30 17,803 -271 3,065 15,009
Latin America 0.56 11,833 -272 535 11,570
Africa 0.24 1,087 -371 340 1,117
Rest of World 0.17 5,580 1,713 2,501 1,366
  
Total world 0.17 55,494 3,080 6,817 45,597
 
 
Global welfare is estimated to increase by US$ 55 billion as a result of the Doha 
agreement, which is not too far from the most recent results obtained by Decreux and 
Fontagné (2008), US$ 43 billion, and by Laborde et al (2008), US$ 87 billion. Asia 
and Latin America in particular stand to gain greatly, accounting for more than 70 
percent of global welfare gains, whereas the USA breaks even and the EU achieves a 
respectable US$ 8 billion in additional welfare. Globally, the income growth corre-
sponds to 0.17 percent of GDP. 
 
The relatively poor results for the USA can largely be explained by the existing pat-
terns of tariffs relative to American trade interests. Duties levied on American exports 
are already very low, whereas sensitive import sectors, notably textiles and vehicles, 
enjoy some protection. Therefore, the USA will not gain much from improved access 
to export markets, and loses a little by opening up to imports. This suggests that cur-
rent tariffs are close to the optimal tariffs of the USA and may provide an explanation 
for why the USA seems less interested in pushing for a successful outcome the the 
negotiations. The opposite argument can be applied to Asian and Latin American 
countries. They stand to reap the bulk of the global welfare gains because they obtain 
improved access to export markets and because their relatively protected economies 
largely benefit from liberalisation. Most developing regions, notably in Africa, actu-
ally loses from the elimination of export subsidies. This suggests that many countries 
are net food importing and experience a deterioration in terms of trade as the elimina-
tion of export subsidies causes food prices to increase. 
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NAMA accounts for the majority of the welfare gains, whereas liberalisation of agri-
culture only adds about US$ 10 billion to welfare. This is partly due to the relatively 
modest reductions in agricultural tariffs by developing countries, partly due to the 
small weight of agriculture in the global economy. Although Doha only shaves a few 
percentage points off industrial tariffs (on average – see Table 1), these liberalisation 
efforts affect the bulk of international merchandise trade, not to mention key indus-
tries such as textiles and vehicles that still enjoy some protection. Thus, even with a 
less than ambitious outcome of the agricultural negotiations, there are still some gains 
to be extracted from a successful Doha-agreement due to NAMA liberalisation. 
 
Table 4. Global welfare impacts of Doha, by product, Million 2001 US$ 
 
Agriculture  Welfare Manufacturing Welfare
 
Cereals 210 Natural resources 2,058
Other crops 946 Clothing 17,754
Bovine animal products 2,528 Wood and paper 480
Other animal products 1,078 Chemical industry 2,696
Dairy products 795 Metals and minerals 3,230
Other processed agriculture 563 Transport equipment 10,420
 Electronics 3,574
 Machinery 7,604
 Other manufacturing 1,356
 
Total agriculture 6,121 Total manufacturing 49,146
 
 
More than two-thirds of welfare increases in agriculture accrue to the livestock sec-
tors, e.g. beef, dairy and pork, mainly due to the fact that these more highly value 
added products face higher trade barriers (se e.g. Table 2) and even partial liberalisa-
tion provide significant benefits. Within manufacturing industries, the clothing and 
transport equipment sectors account for more than half of manufacturing sector wel-
fare gains, for much of the same reasons. These two sectors are among the few indus-
tries that still encounter relatively high tariff barriers. 
The Danish Perspective 
Table 5 presents the welfare impact on Denmark of the Doha agreement disaggre-
gated by sector. In total, Doha raises welfare by US$ 720 million and GDP by 0.3 
percent. It is notable that contrary to the global level, most of the changes take place 
in agriculture. The greatest gains by far (70 percent of total welfare) accrue to the 
other animal products sector, which includes pork production. As demonstrated in 
Table 2 above, this is a result of the improvement in market access outside EU, par-
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ticularly in Japan and other Asian countries, for the relatively competitive Danish 
pork industry. Implications for manufacturing products are more modest, due to the 
fact that trade in the most important non-agricultural products is already liberalised (at 
least in terms of tariffs) and the Doha agreement brings few further gains. As at the 
global level, clothing and transport equipment account for the largest impact. 
 
Table 5.  Danish welfare impacts of Doha, by product, Million 2001 US$ 
 
Agriculture Welfare Manufacturing Welfare
 
Cereals 21 Natural resources 3
Other crops 31 Clothing 65
Bovine animal products -26 Wood and paper 2
Other animal products 504 Chemical industry -4
Dairy products -5 Metals and minerals 9
Other processed agriculture 18 Transport equipment 60
 Electronics 16
 Machinery 22
 Other manufacturing 3
 
Total agriculture 544 Total manufacturing 176
 
 
Table 6 elaborate more on the estimated structural changes taking place in the Danish 
economy following a Doha agreement. It shows the percentage change in production 
by sector, and decomposes the total change into contributions from elimination of ag-
ricultural export subsidies, reductions of tariffs on extra-EU markets, and reduction of 
EU tariffs. For instance, the production of cereals in Denmark is estimated to increase 
by 4.9 percent, which is the sum of a decline by 1.9 percent from the elimination of 
export subsidies, an increase by 6.9 percent resulting from the improved access to 
markets outside EU as tariffs are reduced, and a 0.1 percent decline due to increased 
competition on EU markets as EU reduces own tariffs on cereals.  
 
The most significant changes to the Danish economy are expected to take place in the 
animal products sectors. In particular, the other animal products sector, which in 
Denmark comprises primarily pork production, is estimated to grow by a significant 
18 percent, largely due to better access to markets outside the EU as demonstrated 
above. This represents a huge expansion of pork production and may be a little over-
estimated due to restraining factors not included in the model, such as e.g. environ-
mental regulation restricting the scale of pig production units in Denmark. Note that 
pork production is not adversely affected by increased competition from non-EU 
countries on EU markets because pork production is not highly protected in the EU. 
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Table 6. Change in Danish production, percent 
 
 
 
----------- Tariff reductions -----------
 
 
Production
Export
Subsidies
DK increased
Access to ROW
ROW increased
Access to EU
Cereals 4.9 -1.9 6.9 -0.1
Other Crops. -0.9 1.1 -2.1 0.0
Bovine animal products -13.2 -7.3 0.6 -6.4
Other animal products 17.8 1.3 16.5 0.1
Dairy products -10.1 -7.3 -0.9 -1.9
O
 
ther processed agriculture -1.7 -0.6 -0.1 -0.9
Natural resources 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Clothing -6.5 0.2 -3.2 -3.5
Wood and Paper -0.4 0.0 -0.5 0.2
Chemical industry -0.8 0.1 -1.2 0.2
Metals -0.6 0.1 -0.6 0.0
Transport equipment -2.1 0.1 -1.4 -0.8
Electronics -1.4 0.2 -1.9 0.3
Machinery -1.0 0.2 -1.8 0.5
O
 
ther Manufacturing -0.5 0.1 -0.7 0.1
Services 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1
 
 
The opposite story unfolds within the Bovine and dairy sectors. Bovine animal prod-
ucts decline by 13 percent and dairy by 10 percent. These changes are caused by the 
elimination of export subsidies and by sharply increased competition from non-EU 
suppliers. Beef and dairy are some of the most protected industries in the EU – as 
note in Table 2 above more than 80-90 percent of Danish imports are sourced from 
within the EU - and liberalisation of agricultural trade will adversely affect these sec-
tors across the EU. Note that Danish beef and dairy firms will not only be hurt by im-
port penetration on Danish markets, but also by increased competition on other EU 
markets, to which Danish firms presently enjoy preferential access. Thus, multilateral 
trade liberalisation is also a story of preference erosion for Denmark and other EU 
members. In general the Doha agreement is redirecting Danish exports and imports 
away from the intra-EU market towards the rest of the world. In total, agricultural ex-
ports to the non-EU markets increase by 23 percent reducing exports to the intra EU 
market by 10 percent. 
 
The structural changes in the manufacturing sectors are somewhat smaller than in the 
agricultural sector (in relative terms), and they are mostly negative. The scope for im-
proved market access for Danish export firms is limited because trade in the most im-
portant Danish manufacturing industries is already highly liberalised (se Table 2). 
Thus exports to non-EU markets remain nearly unchanged, while total exports to 
other EU members decline by 2 percent due to increased competition. At the same 
  Trade Liberalisation in the Doha Round      FOI    29 
time, other sectors in the Danish economy, agriculture and services, expand due to 
opened market opportunities and pull away resources (capital and labour) from manu-
facture.   
Discussion 
Is a Doha agreement worth pursuing or a complete waste of political capital? This 
question has been asked repeatedly for the past few years. This paper joins most of 
the applied literature in producing positive, albeit small, welfare effects for the global 
economy as a whole and for all major regions as well. As a result, many economists 
are mostly in favour of free trade in general and the Doha agreement as a small step in 
the right direction. The major arguments against pushing further for a Doha agree-
ment revolves around two issues, the lack of ambition and the potential adverse dis-
tributional consequences. 
 
On the first issue, lack of ambition, the Doha agreement is often criticised for its 
many exceptions and the small size of its estimated economic effects. The 0.2 percent 
growth in global GDP due to the Doha agreement estimated in this paper will neither 
make nor break the world economy. On the other hand, the effect is likely to be un-
derestimated for a number of reasons. The scenario analysed in this paper is designed 
to provide a conservative estimate and can therefore be taken as a lower bound of the 
likely outcome. In addition to Agriculture and NAMA, a Doha agreement will include 
other provisions, such as services liberalisation and trade facilitation. The outcome of 
these issues is highly uncertain (which is why they are not included here), but e.g. 
Decreux and Fontagné (2008) suggest that services liberalisation could add another 
25 percent to their global welfare estimates.  
 
More importantly, the model does not account for ‘productivity’ aspects of trade lib-
eralisation. There is a widespread agreement in the literature that trade liberalisation 
is a cause of productivity growth for a number of reasons. Increased imports or For-
eign Direct Investment may embed new technology and thus facilitate technology 
transfer across borders. Evidence suggest that exporting firms are generally more pro-
ductive than firms concentrating on domestic markets – increased exports raises the 
weight of exporting firms in the economy and will therefore lead to an increase in av-
erage productivity (Bernard and Jensen, 1999). Industries are often characterised by 
increasing returns to scale and as lowering trade barriers expands the extent of the 
market, industries can raise output and move down their average cost curves. These 
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are some of the productivity gains from trade that are easy to identify but hard to 
quantify. 
 
The second main argument against a Doha agreement, the adverse distributional con-
sequences, is most often heard in political circles. Nevertheless, it is an argument that 
economists must take seriously. The simulation results for the Danish economy dem-
onstrate that some sectors win, while others lose. Economists tend to dismiss the im-
portance of distributional consequences, referring to some ideal mechanism that can 
compensate losers from trade liberalisation by lump sum transfer as long as the over-
all outcome is positive. Needless to say, such a mechanism is seldom in place. Den-
mark is actually one of the more advanced economies in this respect, due to its cele-
brated ‘flexicurity’ system, i.e. the welfare state that combines high levels of social 
security with great labour market flexibility. This is probably one of the major reasons 
why most Danes are in favour of free trade (another being the limited size of the Dan-
ish economy). In other countries, such systems are less developed, particularly in de-
veloping countries but also in some advanced countries such as the USA. For in-
stance, the reliance of the US economy on the private market for health insurance 
makes structural change very costly. When people in declining industries are laid off 
they often lose not only their salaries, but also their health insurances. This may be 
one of the reasons why the USA is generally less than enthusiastic about Doha (an-
other is of course the limited overall gains from the agreement). Generally, it is hard 
to divorce the discussion of international trade from the distributional aspects and so-
cial security. 
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Appendix 
The appendix provides more technical details on the Falconer and Stephenson drafts, 
and describes how the provisions are implemented in our Doha-scenario. The draft 
modalities in effect classify WTO-members into seven groups, based on objective cri-
teria. Required tariff reductions are determined on the basis of these groups. The 
groups are: 
• Developed countries: Following the UN definition 
• Developing countries: Countries that are classified as developing according 
to the UN definition, and not belonging to any of the other groups 
• Small, Vulnerable Economies (SVEs): Countries are designated as SVEs if 
their average share of a) world merchandise trade does not exceed 0.16 per-
cent; b) world trade in non-agricultural products is no more than 0.1 percent; 
and c) world trade in agricultural products does not exceed 0.4 percent. In 
addition, a number of (African) countries that do not meet these criteria are 
considered SVE (the agricultural draft modalities provide a list) 
• Countries with a low binding coverage: Some countries have only bound a 
small percentage of their tariffs (less than 35 percent). In return for lower tar-
iff reduction commitments, they are required to bind a large proportion of 
their remaining unbound tariff lines. This category is only singled out in the 
NAMA modalities – in agriculture these countries are treated as SVEs 
• Recently-Acceded Members (RAMs): A number of new WTO members 
(incl. China) face more lenient requirements, as considerable tariff reductions 
were part of their accession agreements 
• Very Recently-Acceded Members (VRAMs): Countries that have become 
members within the last few years are not required to reduce their tariffs fur-
ther, as tariff reductions were part of their accession agreements 
• Least Developed Countries (LDCs): LDCs are not required to reduce their 
own tariffs – they do however receive tariff- and quota-free access to devel-
oping countries as a part of the agreement 
Falconer draft 
Domestic support 
The Uruguay Round Agreement split domestic support into different categories; the 
Amber Box (highly trade-distorting domestic support), the Blue Box (trade-distorting 
domestic support combined with production limiting programmes) and Green Box 
(domestic support with little or no trade distortion). Support in the Amber Box, except 
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for a small share called de minimis (5 percent of product specific and 5 percent of 
non-product specific domestic support; double this for developing countries), was 
summarised as the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) and slated for reduction, 
whereas the Blue and Green boxes were exempt.  
 
The Falconer draft stipulates reductions in final bound total AMS according to a 
tiered formula, summarised in table A1 below, as well as reductions in the shares of 
domestic support that are excluded from AMS under de minimis (by half for devel-
oped countries and one third by developing countries) and the Blue Box (to 2.5 per-
cent of reference value of agricultural production). In addition, a cap on the sum of 
AMS, de minimis and Blue Box support, collectively known as Overall Trade-
Distorting Domestic Support (OTDS), will be reduced by a tiered formula, as summa-
rised in table A1. 
 
Table A1.  Reductions in AMS and OTDS 
 
 ---------- Developed countries ---------- ---------- Developing countries ----------
 Pre-Doha level
(US$ billion) Reduction (%)
Pre-Doha level
(US$ billion) Reduction (%)
 
Tier 1 0 < AMS ≤ 15 45 0 < AMS ≤ 15 30
Tier 2  15 < AMS ≤ 40 60  15 < AMS ≤ 40 40
Tier 3 AMS > 40 70 AMS > 40 46.67
 
 
How we implemented this 
Due to extensive ‘water’ in the domestic support, the reductions in bound domestic 
support will have little, if any, impact on the domestic support actually extended to 
farmers (REF). For instance, the current OTDS payments of the USA amount to 
roughly US$ 9 billion, compared to a new bound OTDS-level of US$ 14.5 billion im-
plied by the Falconer draft. Also, with the mid-term review of the Common Agricul-
tural Policy, large parts of EU domestic support was transferred from the Amber and 
Blue boxes to the Green box that is exempt from reduction commitments, thus reduc-
ing actual OTDS payments below the post-Doha bound level. Therefore, no reduction 
of domestic support is included in the Doha scenario. 
 
Market access 
The draft modalities stipulate that tariff reductions follow a general tiered formula as 
summarised in table A2. 
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Table A2. Agricultural tariff reductions 
 
 Developed countries Developing countries
 Pre-Doha tariff Reduction (%) Pre-Doha tariff Reduction (%)
 
Tier 1 0 < t0 ≤ 20 50 0 < t0 ≤ 30 33.33
Tier 2 20 < t0 ≤ 50 57 30 < t0 ≤ 80 38
Tier 3 50 < t0 ≤ 75 64 80 < t0 ≤ 130 42.67
Tier 4 t0 > 75 70 t0 > 130 46.67
 
Note: Tariff reductions for developing countries are 2/3 of the reduction made by developed countries in the 
same tier. 
 
 
SVEs and countries with a low binding coverage use the tiered formula of developing 
countries, but are allowed to moderate the cuts by 10 ad valorem points. For instance, 
the developing country tiered formula requires a developing country to reduce a 50 
percent tariff to 31 percent (a reduction of 38 percent or 19 points) – an SVE would 
only be required to reduce the 50 percent tariff to 41 percent (a 9 point reduction). 
Similarly, RAMs use the developing country tiered formula moderated by 8 ad 
valorem points and are in addition entitled to exempt all tariffs at or below 10 percent. 
Finally, VRAMs and LDCs are exempt from any tariff reduction commitments. 
 
How we implemented this 
The general tiered formula for agricultural tariff reduction is modeled as described. 
 
Sensitive products 
Countries may designate a number of sensitive products that are entitled to a more le-
nient treatment than the general tiered formula. Developed countries may designate 
up to 4 percent of agricultural tariff lines as sensitive. However, this number may be 
raised to 6 percent if members have more than 30 percent of their tariff lines in the 
top tier (i.e. 30 percent of the tariffs are higher than 75 percent) or if the 4 percent 
level imposes “... a disproportionate constraint in absolute number of tariff lines be-
cause tariff concessions are scheduled at the 6-digit level...” (WTO..., 2008, p. 14). 
Developing countries (including SVEs, countries with a lower bound coverage and 
RAMs) are entitled to designate as sensitive one third more tariff lines than developed 
countries. 
 
WTO operates at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized System nomenclature, which is 
the same for all members. However, each member country is entitled to further disag-
gregate the tariff lines using idiosyncratic 8- or 10-digit codes. This is significant be-
cause a more disaggregated schedule provides a greater number of agricultural tariff 
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lines and hence a larger number of tariff lines that may be designated as sensitive. 
Members are thereby able to more accurately pinpoint the most sensitive tariff lines. 
This is why members with a tariff schedule at the 6-digit level are entitled to desig-
nate additional tariff lines as sensitive. 
 
How we implemented this 
We use tariff data at the 6-digit level and are therefore unable to designate sensitive 
products are a more disaggregated level. To compensate for this, we apply the excep-
tion provided by the Falconer draft and designate 6 percent of tariff lines as sensitive 
for developed countries and 8 percent for developing countries. 
 
We have no prior information on which particular tariff lines are likely to be desig-
nated as sensitive by each country. We therefore have to estimate the schedule of sen-
sitive tariffs based on some criteria. Different approaches have been suggested in the 
literature. For instance, Decreux and Fontagné (2008) designate as sensitive the tariff 
lines that have the highest applied tariff rate multiplied by imports. We use a slightly 
different criterion. We assume that the most sensitive products are primarily the ones 
most heavily protected, and secondarily the ones with the highest imports. In practice, 
we sort tariff lines in descending order according to applied tariffs, rounded to the 
nearest 25 percent, and within each tariff range according to imports. When choosing 
sensitive tariff lines, we start from the top and stop when the number of tariff lines 
corresponds to 6 percent/8 percent of all agricultural tariff lines. For instance, a tariff 
line with an applied tariff of 90 percent (rounded to a 100) without imports is as-
sumed to be more sensitive than an applied tariff of 70 percent (rounded to 75) with 
some imports. In this way, we ensure that a tariff, which is set very high in order to 
discourage any imports (a prohibitive tariff), will likely be designated as sensitive. 
This is contrary to Decreux’s and Fontagné’s approach, which would value a tariff 
line with high tariff and no imports equal to a tariff line with zero tariff and high im-
ports.  
 
Tariff Rate Quota expansion 
Member countries are entitled to reduce their sensitive product tariffs by a smaller 
proportion than the standard tiered formula in return for an expansion in tariff quotas 
for those sensitive products. The draft modalities allow members to choose between 
three different options with respect to sensitive product and tariff quota expansion. 
For the designated sensitive products, members may reduce the tariff cuts stipulated 
by the general tiered formula by one third, one half or two thirds in return for tariff 
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quota expansions of 3 percent, 3.5 percent and 4 percent of domestic consumption, 
respectively. 
 
How we implemented this 
Tariff quota expansion is not part of the Doha scenario analysed in this paper (just as 
they are not part of similar scenarios analysed in the literature, e.g. Decreux and Fon-
tagné, 2008). To minimise the bias produced by this omission, we assume countries 
choose the first sensitive product option, i.e. sensitive product tariff cuts are reduced 
by one third relative to the standard tiered formula cut. 
 
Special products 
Developing countries are entitled to designate 12 percent of tariff lines as special 
products, based on objective criteria related to rural livelihood protection. Up to five 
of the 12 percent may be totally exempt from any tariff reduction and the only other 
requirement is that the average tariff cut of all special products (including the reduc-
tion-exempt ones) shall be at least 11 percent. SVEs may instead choose to designate 
all tariff lines as special products (and thereby bypass the standard tiered formula), 
provided that the average tariff reduction is no less than 24 percent. RAMs are enti-
tled to 13 percent of tariff lines as special products with an average cut of 10 percent. 
Special products designation is in addition to entitlements for sensitive products. 
 
How we implemented this 
In principle, special products cannot be selected freely but must be identified accord-
ing to a number of objective criteria listed in the Falconer draft. However, the criteria 
are so broadly defined that most products may be argued to fall under one or more of 
the criteria. We therefore assume that the criteria are not binding in practice, thus pro-
viding a conservative estimation of special product designation. We use the same cri-
teria for special product selection by developing countries as the one used for sensi-
tive products. We assume that the most sensitive products (by the criteria used here) 
will first be designated as special product exempt from tariff reduction (up to first five 
percent), then as special product with 11/10 percent average tariff cut (next 
seven/eight percent), and finally as sensitive product (next eight percent).  
 
First, we calculate the average tariff reduction of the potential special products (the 
first 12/13 percent of tariff lines) implied by the standard tiered formula in order to 
test for the applicability of special products designation. In some cases (e.g. China), 
the standard tiered formula produced an average tariff reduction of less than the 11/10 
percent required for special products, and no special products were designated. Then, 
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one by one we exempt the most sensitive products from tariff reduction and re-
calculate the average tariff cut implied by the standard tiered formula over the re-
maining special products. This continues until we have exempted up to five percent of 
tariff lines or the average cut of all special products reaches 11/10 percent, whichever 
comes first. If the average special-product cut still exceeds the required threshold af-
ter five percent of tariff lines have been exempted, we reduce the tariff cuts of the re-
maining special products proportionately to reach the required threshold. 
 
Special Safeguard Mechanism 
The Special Safeguard Mechanism allows developing countries to temporarily (one 
year at a time and a maximum of two consecutive years) raise tariffs in response to 
sudden surges in imports or drops in the price of imports. The volume-based imports 
trigger has three thresholds of 110, 115 and 135 percent of a reference level of im-
ports calculated as the rolling average of import of the three preceding years. Each 
trigger allows developing countries to raise tariffs by 25, 40 and 50 percent respec-
tively of bound tariffs or percentage points, whichever is greater. The price-based 
trigger is 85 percent of a rolling average of the MFN-sourced import price of the three 
most recent years, which allows an extra tariff corresponding to 85 percent of the dif-
ference between the import price and the trigger price. The disagreement that broke 
the deal at the mini-ministerial in July 2008 was the size of the volume-based trigger 
that would allow the temporary extra tariff to breach the current (i.e. pre-Doha) bound 
tariff ceiling. The USA insisted it should be in response to an import surge of at least 
40 percent, whereas China and India wanted the threshold to be set at 10 or 15 percent 
(Bridges, vol. 12, 7 August 2008). 
 
How we implemented this 
The SSM is a temporary measure, the use of which is unpredictable. The SSM is 
therefore not implemented in the Doha scenario, which is standard practice in the lit-
erature (e.g. Decreux and Fontagné, 2008). 
 
Tariff Escalation 
The Falconer draft specifies a list of primary product – processed product linkages for 
which provisions on tariff escalation applies. Tariffs of any processed product that has 
a primary product link according to this table are subject to larger than standard re-
duction, unless the difference between primary product and processed product tariff 
after the application of the standard tiered formula is less than 5 ad valorem points. 
The processed product tariff shall be treated as if it falls within the next higher tier in 
the tiered formula, except for tariffs in the highest tier which will be reduced by a fur-
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ther 6 ad valorem points. For instance, a 40 percent processed product tariff will be 
cut by 64 percent and not the 57 percent stipulated by the standard tiered formula. The 
extra tariff reduction applied shall not reduce processed product tariffs below the 
(post-Doha) tariff of the linked primary product. The tariff escalation provisions apply 
to developed countries and developing countries declaring themselves to be in a posi-
tion to do so.  
 
How we implement this 
The tariff escalation provisions are implemented for developed countries largely as 
stipulated in the draft modalities (we assume that no developing countries volunteer to 
apply the provisions). First, we apply the standard tiered formula to test the applica-
bility of the provisions. If a process product uses more than one primary product, we 
test against the simple average of primary product tariffs. Then we apply the relevant 
tariff reduction and test whether the resulting processed product tariff is smaller than 
the post-Doha primary product tariff, in which case the processed product tariff is set 
equal to the post-Doha primary product tariff. 
 
Tropical products and diversification products 
Tropical and diversification products (a list is provided in the Falconer draft) are sub-
ject to larger than standard tariff reduction by developed countries and developing 
countries declaring themselves in a position to do so. There are two specific options: 
1. Tariffs below 25 percent shall be reduced to zero – tariffs above 25 percent 
shall be reduced by 85 percent with no allowance for sensitive product desig-
nation. 
2. Tariffs below 10 percent shall be reduced to zero – tariffs above 10 percent 
shall be reduced by the percentage implied by the top-tier of the standard 
formula (i.e. 70 percent), or if the tariff already belongs to the top tier, by an 
additional 8 ad valorem points. The sensitive products provisions apply as 
normal. 
 
How we implement this 
The first option is by far the more far-reaching of the two and would result in dra-
matic reductions in some highly sensitive tariffs, such as Japanese rice tariffs. In line 
with the objective of this paper to provide a conservative estimate, we assume that the 
second option applies for all countries. The provision is implemented as described. 
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Minimum and maximum reductions 
Developed countries shall reduce all tariffs by an overall average of at least 54 per-
cent, when taking into account the standard tiered formula as well as all exceptions 
described above. Similarly, developing countries are required to reduce tariffs by an 
overall average of at most 36 percent, when accounting for all provisions. 
 
How we implemented this 
After calculating all cuts to tariffs resulting from the application of the standard tiered 
formula and subject to all exceptions, we derive the overall average tariff reduction. If 
the average cut is below 54 percent for developed countries or above 36 percent for 
developing countries, all tariffs are increased or reduced proportionately to reach the 
relevant thresholds. 
 
Least developed countries (LDCs) 
Least developed countries are not required to undertake any reductions in bound tar-
iffs. In addition, developed countries are required to provide quota- and duty-free ac-
cess to LDCs; 97 percent of tariff lines immediately and the rest after an implementa-
tion period. 
 
How we implemented this 
We exempt LDCs from making any reductions in tariffs and eliminate all developed 
country tariffs on imports from LDCs. 
 
Other provisions 
The Falconer draft contains a number of other provisions that are presented as en-
couragements, are still unspecified or have little actual implications for applied tariffs. 
Therefore, they are not specifically implemented in the scenario. These are: 
• Commodities: Commodity-dependent developing countries are encouraged to 
help identify primary commodities affected by tariff escalation to be adopted 
as part of the modalities. In addition, provisions should be made to ensure the 
possibility that members may adopt “…intergovernmental commodity 
agreements for stabilization of prices for exports of agricultural commodi-
ties…”. No specific details are provided in the present revision of the Fal-
coner draft. 
• Special Agricultural Safeguard (SSG): The SSG was introduced in the Uru-
guay Round Agreement and is similar to the SSM, except that it also applies 
to developed countries. Provisions are included in the Falconer draft to 
eliminate or reduce the SSG. Since the SSG a temporary measure and not 
part of the baseline, its elimination/reduction will not affect the modeled 
economy and is therefore not included in the Doha-scenario. 
• Tariff simplification: Measures designed to convert complex tariffs, such as 
specific tariffs (an absolute amount levied relative to a quantity measure, e.g. 
X$ per tonnes) into simple ad valorem tariffs (tariffs measured as a percent-
age of import value). The conversion will take place on the basis of the ad 
valorem equivalent of complex tariffs and will therefore have no implications 
for actual tariffs. 
• Preference erosion: Specific provisions cover products that are of particular 
interest to least developed countries enjoying preferential access to developed 
country markets. Tariffs on such products will be reduced over a longer im-
plementation period. These provisions do not affect the end result of the 
Doha agreement – only the pace of implementation. As we use a static 
model, the provisions have no consequences for our Doha scenario. 
• Cotton market access: Developed countries shall provide quota- and duty-
free access on cotton to least developed countries from the first day of the 
implementation period. This provision is largely overlapped by the commit-
ments by developed countries to provide free market access for all products 
from LDCs and is therefore already implemented in the Doha-scenario 
 
Export subsidies 
The Falconer draft requires all countries (developing and developed) to eliminate all 
export subsidies (following certain implementation periods). In a specific clause, 
members commit to eliminate export subsidies on cotton from the first day of the im-
plementation period. 
 
How we implement this 
All export subsidies are eliminated in the Doha scenario. 
Stephenson draft 
Swiss formula 
The general rule for tariff reduction in NAMA liberalisation is the so-called Swiss 
formula, defined as 
 
0
1
0
t
t
t
α
α= +  
 
42    FOI    Trade Liberalisation in the Doha Round     
  Trade Liberalisation in the Doha Round      FOI    43 
where t0 is the pre-Doha bound tariff, t1 is the post-Doha bound tariff and α is the 
Swiss formula coefficient. If a tariff line is not bound, t0 is defined as the Most-
Favoured Nations tariff rate, plus a constant mark-up of 25 percentage points. The 
Swiss formula has two desirable properties: i) it is non-linear and reduces higher tar-
iffs more and therefore serves to eliminate tariff peaks; and ii) tariffs are in effect 
capped at the level defined by the coefficient, i.e. t1 < α.  
 
The Stephenson draft together with Lamy’s compromise proposal stipulate different 
coefficients depending on how countries are classified. For developed countries, α = 
8, implying that post-Doha bound tariffs are at most 8 percent. Provisions for devel-
oping countries and other classifications are more complex. 
 
How we implement this 
The general Swiss formula is implemented as described. All developed country tariffs 
are reduced using a coefficient of 8. 
Developing countries 
Developing countries face higher Swiss formula coefficients than developed coun-
tries, and they are allowed certain flexibilities for more lenient treatment of some 
products. In effect, the draft modalities propose five options for combining different 
coefficients with varying degrees of flexibility: 
• Option 1: α = 20 together with one-half Swiss formula reduction for 14 per-
cent of tariff lines covering no more than 16 percent of imports by value. 
• Option 2: α = 20 together with reduction exemption for 6.5 percent of tariff 
lines accounting for 7.5 percent of imports. 
• Option 3: α = 22 together with one-half Swiss formula reduction for 10 per-
cent of tariff lines covering at most 10 percent of imports. 
• Option 4: α = 22 together with no cuts for 5 percent of tariff lines or imports 
(whichever comes first) 
• Option 5: α = 25 with no use of flexibilities 
 
Anti-concentration 
The Stephenson draft introduces the concept of anti-concentration to prevent develop-
ing countries in choosing to exert all their flexibility options in a small number of 
highly protected industries. The Lamy compromise proposal defines this to mean that 
at least 20 percent of tariff lines or 9 percent of import value in each HS chapter (i.e. 
product categories at 2-digit level) shall be subject to full tariff reduction. 
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How we implement this 
We use the same criteria for determining tariff lines chosen for flexibility as for the 
sensitive product designation under agriculture. During the identification of flexibil-
ities, we check for the anti-concentration requirement. In case the maximum number 
of tariff lines and imports covered by flexibility in a given chapter is reached, the 
flexibility designation jumps to the next most sensitive chapter. We calculate the tariff 
reductions implied by all five options and assume that each developing country 
chooses the option that requires the smallest overall average tariff cut.  
Countries with low binding coverage 
Instead of commitments to reduce bound tariffs, countries with less than 35 
percent of non-agricultural tariff lines bound are required to bind most of 
their remaining tariff lines at a level of their own choosing, subject to a re-
quirement that the overall average of bound tariffs does not exceed 28.5 
percent. 
 
How we implement this 
We calculated the overall average of all MFN applied tariffs of countries with a low 
binding coverage, and none of them applied tariffs that exceeded 28.5 percent on av-
erage. They could bind tariffs at levels equal to or higher than their MFN applied tar-
iffs, which would not result in any reduction of applied tariffs. Thus, in the Doha sce-
nario countries with low binding coverage do not cut any applied tariffs. 
Small, Vulnerable Economies 
SVEs are exempt from making reductions through the Swiss formula. Instead, they 
are required to bind their tariffs at different overall average levels according to a 
tiered formula as summarised in table A3. 
 
Table A3.  SVE bound tariff commitments 
 
Pre-Doha average bound tariff Post-Doha average bound tariff
 
> 50 [28 – 32]
30 – 50 [24 – 28]
20 – 30 18
< 20 Average of  95 percent of Pre-Doha bound
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How we implement this 
We calculated the overall average of bound tariffs and deduced the post-Doha bound 
average from table A3. Then we calculated the overall average of MFN applied tariffs 
and compared with the Post-Doha bound average. In all cases the average MFN ap-
plied tariffs were lower than the reduced bound tariffs, and we concluded that SVEs 
could fulfil their Doha commitments without reducing their applied tariffs. Thus, in 
the Doha-scenario SVEs do not cut any applied tariffs. 
Recently Acceded Members 
RAMs are treated in the same way as developing countries, except that they are enti-
tled to a longer implementation period. 
 
How we implement this 
As we use a static model, we do not explicitly model the implementation period. Thus 
RAMs are treated in exactly the same way as developing countries. 
Very Recently Aceeded Members and Least Developed Countries 
VRAMs and LDCs are exempt from any tariff reduction commitments. In addition, 
LDCs receive quota- and duty-free access to developed country markets. 
 
How we implement this 
VRAMs and LDCs are implemented as described. 
Other provisions 
The Stephenson draft contains additional provisions that have not yet been negotiated 
in any detail or are not related to reduction of tariffs. These provisions are not in-
cluded in the Doha-scenario: 
• Sectoral negotiations: Negotiations on further liberalisation of specific sec-
tors, such as the automotive sector, may take place after the establishment of 
the modalities on a non-mandatory basis. Such negotiations can facilitate 
compromise on the Doha agreement by focusing liberalisation efforts on sec-
tors of key interest to members. However, it is still uncertain if and to which 
extent this provision will be utilised. 
• Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs): The further disciplining of the use of NTBs is 
part of the NAMA modalities, in the form of generic and sector-specific side-
 
46    FOI    Trade Liberalisation in the Doha Round     
agreements akin to the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement intro-
duced in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. As NTBs are not re-
flected in the GTAP model and database, the Doha scenario does not imple-
ment provisions on NTBs. 
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